In January 2013, this case was removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction and assigned to MDL 875. The plaintiffs alleged asbestos exposure while serving in the Navy. Applying maritime law, the court granted summary judgments filed by Buffalo Pumps, CBS Corporation, Foster Wheeler, General Electric, IMO Industries, and Warren Pumps, based upon the bare metal defense. The plaintiffs appealed and the Third Circuit remanded the case to the MDL court to clarify whether it: (1) considered the negligence theory of liability; (2) concluded that the bare metal defense applied to negligence claims; (3) considered whether this case warranted application of the legal rationale by which other courts exempted negligence claims from being barred by the defense. The MDL court clarified as follows.
The court offered a brief history of the application of the bare metal defense, noting that the MDL adopted this defense as applied by the Sixth Circuit in two separate maritime cases. In deciding to adopt these decisions, the MDL also noted that most of the asbestos cases pending in the MDL originated in the Sixth Circuit. While an MDL court applies the law of the Circuit in which it sits to matters of substantive federal law, at the time of this case the bare metal defense had never been squarely addressed by the Third Circuit, where this case originated. However, although this case was not part of the maritime docket, the application of federal maritime law must be consistent.
Thus, applying maritime law, the plaintiffs must show evidence of sufficient exposure to asbestos from a defendant’s products in order to hold them liable under any theory of liability (whether strict liability or negligence). Maritime law imposed no duty to warn of the dangers associated with another manufacturer’s product or component part. “For this reason, there can be no liability in negligence for asbestos exposure arising from a product (or component part) that a manufacturer defendant did not manufacture or supply (as a plaintiff will not be able to establish the breach of any duty to warn about that other product).” The court found that: “… in the maritime law regime, an asbestos product manufacturer defendant (1) has no ‘duty’ to warn about a ‘product’ that it did not manufacture or supply (and has a ‘duty’ to warn only about ‘products’ it manufactured or supplied), and, in keeping with this delineation of ‘duty,’ (2) can only be liable in negligence if there is evidence of (a sufficient amount of) exposure to asbestos from a ‘product’ it manufactured or supplied, in part because the ‘causation’ element is not satisfied (i.e., a ‘breach’ of the ‘duty’ to warn has only ‘caused’ the injury at issue where the alleged asbestos exposure has arisen from a ‘product’ for which the manufacturer defendant had a ‘duty’ to warn).” Therefore, absent evidence of sufficient exposure, maritime law barred both negligent failure-to-warn claims and strict liability claims.
Further, the MDL clarified that this case did not warrant application of legal rationales by which other courts exempted negligence claims from being barred by this defense, because these other courts analyzed state law, not maritime law. The MDL summarized its final findings: (1) it did consider the plaintiff’s negligent failure-to-warn claims; (2) it determined that the defense bars both strict liability and negligent failure-to-warn claims, and; (3) maritime law’s application of the defense rejected potential liability of a product manufacturer in negligence for products (or component parts) it did not manufacture or supply.