Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Testimony of General Causation Not Permitted to Prove Specific Causation in Mesothelioma Case

The defendants moved in limine to preclude testimony of the plaintiffs’ experts Drs. Kradin, Kraus and Parker for their reliance on the “each and every exposure” methodology of causation.

The court began its analysis by stating the standard for expert qualification, which includes: 1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue 2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data 3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and 4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Additionally, factors to consider include whether the technique has been tested, whether the technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, the potential error rate, the existence of maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, and whether the technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

As for Dr. Kradin, the defendants argued that he should be excluded for terminating his deposition early and prior to completion. However, the court noted that the deposition had since concluded and that exclusion on those grounds would be “disproportionate.” The defendants also argued that Dr. Kraus should be excluded as an expert because he lacked qualifications to discuss causation of the plaintiff’s mesothelioma as a radiation oncologist. The court disagreed and stated that the standards are liberal and an expert’s qualification need not be perfect.

However, the court launched into an analysis of “each and every exposure” and pointed out the court “continues” to reject such a proposition calling it an argument ipse dixit. The plaintiff’s experts tried to circumvent this challenge by stating that each and every significant exposure was the cause of the plaintiff’s mesothelioma. The court was not persuaded and found no material difference between each and every exposure and every significant exposure. Accordingly, the court would not permit the plaintiffs’ experts to testify generally in causation to meet their burden of causation specific to this plaintiff.

Read the full decision here.