U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Plaintiff Mallory Ware was diagnosed with lung cancer in May 2020. He alleged his occupational exposure to asbestos and toxic welding fumes caused his illness. He initiated a lawsuit in state court against both premises owners and manufacturers, sellers, suppliers, contractors, and distributors of asbestos-containing products. The plaintiff divided his claims into three counts: (1) negligence against all defendants; (2) strict liability and negligence against the premise defendants; and (3) strict liability and negligence against the manufacturers, sellers, suppliers, contractors, and distributors.
Defendant Marathon removed the suit to federal court, asserting federal-question subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s claims against it and other defendants fell under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Marathon then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively Rule 12(e) motion arguing the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. More specifically, Marathon contended the plaintiff’s complaint did not contain a short and plain statement with sufficient facts to notify Marathon of the substance of the plaintiff’s claims. Further, it stated the plaintiff’s allegations that “sound in fraud” lacked the required particularity pursuant to Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff disagreed and pointed to the facts in his complaint including: (1) that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos-containing dust and welding fumes while working at Marathon’s premises, rendering the premises unreasonably dangerous; (2) that Marathon failed to warn the plaintiff of the risk of welding fumes; and (3) that Marathon was in control or custody of the dangerous chemicals. The plaintiff admitted he did not supply the “when” or “where” of Marathon’s alleged tortious actions. However, he also contended Marathon would be in a better position to have this information, based on the length of the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff also conceded he did not allege fraud. Nevertheless, Marathon reiterated its prior statements and argued the plaintiff’s complaint constituted a “shotgun pleading” since the allegations against Marathon were lumped together with those of the other defendants.
The court noted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. This does not mean a “detailed factual allegation” must be included. Nonetheless, Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order to survive such a motion, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient enough “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” As such, while a court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” it does not need to “accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Alternatively, Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may seek a more definite statement if a complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
The court ruled that in the Eleventh Circuit, a “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that fails “to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at *6. The court concluded the plaintiff’s complaint was not a shotgun pleading, despite Marathon’s claims. The plaintiff’s complaint included the time period of his claims, the activity alleged to have caused his injury, the legal theories of recovery, and the remedies sought. Thus, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently described the facts underlying his claim to allow Marathon to prepare an answer. Further, it concluded the appropriate recourse would have been a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(e), and that further facts would be uncovered in discovery. The court thus denied both Marathon’s motion to dismiss and its motion for a more definite statement.
Read the full decision here.