David Baeza and Vana Baeza filed suit against defendants including Special Electric Company, a distributor of raw crocidolite asbestos fibers called ML-6 following his diagnosis with mesothelioma. Special Electric had supplied ML-6 raw asbestos fibers to Johns-Manville beginning in the mid-1970s. David Baeza’s father had worked at a Johns-Manville plant in Long Beach, California, and David was exposed as a child to asbestos dust that clung to his father’s shoes, clothes, hair, and skin. At the time of trial, the only causes of action that remained were strict product liability based on the consumer expectation test for defective design and loss of consortium.
Under the consumer expectation test, “a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” The strict liability cause of action alleged that Special Electric had supplied Johns-Mansville with a defectively designed product, raw asbestos. The plaintiffs claimed that the raw asbestos was defective because it was not as safe as an ordinary consumer would have expected, and because of the serious potential harm resulting from its use; Special Electric was aware that raw asbestos was dangerous and defective when used in the intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; David was exposed to Special Electric’s raw asbestos fibers, and such exposure was reasonably foreseeable to Special Electric; David was unaware of the dangers inherent in breathing asbestos dust; David was never warned that he could contract any disease or injury as a result of being in the vicinity of asbestos dust; the defect in the asbestos was a substantial factor and legal cause in David’s injuries; and that Special Electric was aware of the risk of harm to those exposed to its product and was indifferent to David’s health, safety, and welfare. The jury found by special verdict that David was exposed to asbestos supplied by Special Electric, the asbestos was not modified or misused after it left the possession of Special Electric, and the asbestos did not fail to perform as safely as would be expected by an ordinary reasonable consumer. Because the latter finding disposed of the sole liability theory, the court entered a defense judgment.
On appeal, the plaintiffs sought a reversal of the judgment, claiming the jury was unduly, improperly and prejudicially confused about what evidence it should consider in making its determination on the consumer expectation test. The plaintiffs suggested that defense counsel mislead the jury about what evidence was relevant to the consumer expectation test and that the trial court failed to address the jury confusion through adequate jury instructions. The Court disagreed. The court found that the trial court correctly determined that the jury itself would decide whether the workers at the Johns-Manville facility were ordinary consumers of ML-6 and that the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the use of ML-6 at the plant were relevant to determine what the ordinary consumer would “expect.” For the same reason, the court reached the conclusion that defense counsel’s closing arguments were proper and the record did not support the allegation that counsel improperly referred to evidence admitted for a purpose unrelated to the consumer expectation test. Finally, the court disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument that the jury was confused by the special verdict form as a result of the trial court’s instructions. The court held that based on its review of the record it concluded that the “the jury was correctly instructed on the law, and its finding for Special Electric was supported by substantial evidence.” Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.