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Supreme Court of New York Grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based upon Statute of Limitations

Supreme Court of New York – New York County

Eric Biljetina, et al. vs. Brenntag North America, Inc., et al.

In this action, the plaintiffs allege the decedent had asbestos exposure through the use of Jean Nate talcum powder. The decedent was ultimately diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2016. In 2024, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint to join L’Oreal USA, Inc., as a defendant in this action. The plaintiffs alleged this defendant had ties to the claimed Jean Nate powder product. The defendant ultimately filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice based upon the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed the defendant’s motion. The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiffs’ opposition and in further support of its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.

A defendant may move to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint “on the ground that[]” the “statute of limitations” bars the complaint, as the plaintiff was late in bringing his claims. See CPLR § 3211(a)(5); see also Monahemi v Gohari, 2021 NYLJ LEXIS 925, *8 (Sup Ct, Nassau County, Sept. 8, 2021, No. 604531/2020) (“[T]o determine the timeliness of the plaintiff’s claims …, the Court must first consider what the statute of limitations is for each cause of action alleged in the summons and complaint.”). With limited exceptions, an action for personal injury from exposure to substances with latent effects, as here, must be brought within three years of “the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff” or of “the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.” See CPLR § 214-c(2).

Here, the court found the decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2016. As the plaintiffs allege injuries from exposure to a substance with a latent effect – asbestos – the plaintiffs had three years from the date of the decedent’s mesothelioma diagnosis to bring suit against the defendant. Yet the plaintiffs did not initiate litigation against the defendant until 2024. Consequently, the court held the plaintiffs’ claims are untimely based upon the governing statute of limitations. Id.

The court next considered two potential exceptions that may be applicable to permit the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed against the defendant. The first exception, equitable estoppel, is less a defense to the statute of limitations and more an affirmative argument that the statute of limitations has not kicked in due to tolling of the limitations period. See Putter v N Shore Univ. Hosp., 7 NY3d 548, 552-553, 858 N.E.2d 1140, 825 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2006). “[E]quitable estoppel … preclude[s] a defendant from using the statute of limitations as a defense where it is the defendant’s affirmative wrongdoing … which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding.” Id, at 552, quoting Zumpano v Quinn, 6 NY3d 666, 673, 849 N.E.2d 926, 816 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2006); see also Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 448-449, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978) (“[A] defendant may be estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations where plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action.”). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that they “reasonabl[y] reli[ed] on the defendant’s” wrongdoing. Zumpano, 6 NY3d at 674. Here, the court found the plaintiffs had not sufficiently demonstrated any wrongdoing by the defendant to warrant the application of equitable estoppel. As such, the court considered the next potential exception.

The second exception, the relation-back doctrine, allows a plaintiff to add a new defendant after the statute of limitations shield kicks in. To do so, the plaintiff must prove three things: (1) that the claims against the new defendant “arose out of [the] same conduct, transaction or occurrence” as the claims against the original defendants; (2) that the new defendant “is ‘united in interest’ with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that [the new defendant] will not be prejudiced in maintaining [a] defense on the merits”; and (3) that the new defendant “knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mistake by plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the [original] action would have been brought against [the new defendant] as well.” Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 178, 661 N.E.2d 978, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1995), quoting Brock v Bua, 83 AD2d 61, 69, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2d Dep’t 1981); see also CPLR § 203(c), (f) (providing the statutory bases for the relation-hack doctrine); Garcia v New York-Presbyt. Hosp., 114 AD3d 615, 615, 981 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep’t 2014) (establishing that the “plaintiff[] b[ears] the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the relation-back doctrine”).

As to the plaintiffs’ relation-back-doctrine argument, the court found the plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that the defendant “is ‘united in interest’ with [any of] the original defendant[s]” such that Defendant “can be charged with … notice of the [original] action.” Buran, 87 NY2d at 178 (quoting Brock, 83 AD2d at 69) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the defendant’s lone attenuated tie to this case is through a corporate entity which was never a party to this action and was solely tied to this action through the broader corporate umbrella. A judgment against any of the original defendants does not “similar affect” or implicate the defendant, so as to warrant a finding of unity of interest, see Prudential Ins. Co, of Am. v. Stone, 270 NY 154, 159, 200 N.E. 679 (1936), because Defendant never had anything to do with the Jean Nate product line. As such, the Court concluded that Defendant is a “new defendant [that] has been a complete stranger to the suit up to th[is] point …, and therefore the bar of the Statute of Limitations must be applied.” Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 NY2d 473, 477, 488 N.E.2d 820, 497 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1985). Thus, the plaintiffs’ relation-back argument fails.

The court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon the governing statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5).

Read the full decision here.