Jurisdiction: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
Appellant Westrock Minnesota Corporation f/k/a Waldorf Corporation (Waldorf), challenged the district court’s ruling, denying summary judgment on respondent’s asbestos-related claims. Appellant argued the asbestos related claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), Minn. Stat. § 176.031.
In 2023, respondent Allan N. Anderson Jr. was diagnosed with mesothelioma. On March 30, 2023, he filed a complaint against 34 separate defendants, including Waldorf alleging that exposures to asbestos via products manufactured, sold, or distributed by defendants caused his mesothelioma. Mr. Anderson’s wife, respondent Cynthia Anderson, asserted a loss of consortium claim arising from Mr. Anderson’s injury.
Mr. Anderson worked as a pipefitter apprentice, pipefitter, journeyman welder, and foreman from approximately the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. During this time, he allegedly oversaw abatement work performed by other companies. Although Mr. Anderson did not perform the abatement work himself, he testified he was nevertheless exposed to asbestos during his employment for Waldorf from 1988 to 1993.
In their motion for summary judgment, appellant claimed that if respondents proved their claims, Mr. Anderson’s injury necessarily arose out of asbestos exposures that occurred during his Waldorf employment. Thus, the Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy against Waldorf.
Respondents opposed the motion and stipulated that Mr. Anderson’s exposures while working as a Waldorf employee “are governed by the provisions of Minnesota’s workers’ compensation act.” Nevertheless, respondents sought to disclaim the employment-related exposures and only pursue claims against Waldorf for exposures at the St. Paul paper mill from 1985 to 1988 — the brief time window when Waldorf owned the mill and Mr. Anderson was periodically there as a Pioneer Power employee (not as a Waldorf employee).
The district court agreed with respondents, adopting the analysis in Strong v. A.H. Bennett Co., No. 62-CV-16-5141 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017), and concluded there is no justification under Minnesota law to allow Waldorf to benefit from the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation law when it did not employ Mr. Anderson during the alleged injurious exposure at issue. The court permitted respondents to proceed with their negligence and premises liability claims against Waldorf stating that respondents were seeking relief for the injurious exposure at a time when Mr. Anderson was not employed.
In reviewing a summary-judgment decision, the Appellate Court must determine “whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “If there is any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, that doubt must be resolved in favor of finding that a fact issue exists.” Jonathan v. Kvaal, 403 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. May 20, 1987). “Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable persons might reach different conclusions after reviewing the evidence.” Id. Appellate courts do not determine issues of fact rather only if there are issues of fact to be determined. Kucera v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966); Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672,679 (Minn. App. 2009) (“It is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal”) (quoting Kucera 146 N.W.2d at 183).
The issue before the court was whether the exclusivity provision of the WCA bars respondents’ complaint against Waldorf. Under the WCA, when an employee is injured in the course of their employment, the WCA requires the employer to compensate the injured employee regardless of the fault of the employer. Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2022) (“Every employer is liable . . . to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to the question of negligence.”). The WCA is premised on the theory that employers, rather than employees, should bear the financial burden of employee injuries as a cost of doing business. SeeArens v. Hanecy, 269 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1978)
When the injury manifests in the form of an occupational disease “the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed in a significant way to the hazard of the occupational disease” is liable for the employee’s compensation. Minn. Stat. §176.66, subd. 10 (2022). This provides a liberalized approach in considering occupational diseases and is intended to cover diseases that: (1) arise out of the employment; (2) bear a direct and causal connection to the work performed; and (3) follow as a natural incident of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by the employment such that they may be classified as occupational diseases. Gray v. City of St. Paul, 84 N.W.2d 606, 615 (1957). The disablement from an occupational disease is regarded as a personal injury within the meaning of the WCA. Minn. Stat. §176.66, subd. 1.
Within the WCA is an exclusivity provision that states that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee . . . or other person entitled to recover damages on account of such injury.” Minn. Stat. § 176.031 (emphasis added). Under the exclusivity provision, when there is an injury compensable under the WCA, the exclusivity provision provides that the “liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive.” Id. The exclusivity provision “has been a part of workers’ compensation law in Minnesota since its inception in 1913.” U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. James Courtney Law Office, P.A., 662 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 2003). If the provision applies, the injured party may not seek other remedies against the employer and a district court lacks jurisdiction in any action by the employee seeking those remedies. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 832.
While the Appellate Court disagreed with the district court’s reasoning, the lower court’s decision was affirmed. Regardless of whether the “injurious period” relevant to Mr. Anderson’s tort claims fell outside of his employment with Waldorf, the WCA is still the exclusive remedy for Waldorf’s liability if respondent was last exposed to asbestos in a significant way while employed by Waldorf.
However, the Appellate Court determined there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether he was exposed to asbestos in a significant way at Waldorf. Specifically, it must be determined if Mr. Anderson’s injury arose from his employment, whether there exists a direct causal connection between the condition and work performed, and if so whether Mr. Anderson was “exposed in a significant way to the hazard of the occupational disease” while employed by Waldorf. Therefore, the district court’s decision was affirmed.
Read the full decision here