The decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma and alleged take-home asbestos exposure from the work of her father with defendant Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) and also alleged exposure from her father’s personal automotive work. The decedent’s father repaired and maintained air brake systems on PATCO’s locomotives. Railroad defendants (Delaware River Port Authority, Railroad Friction Products Corporation, Thyssenkrupp Budd Company, Pneumo-Abex) moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were preempted by federal law. The district court granted this motion, ruling that federal legislation and precedent preempted state tort claims related to locomotives. Automotive defendants also moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of frequent, regular and proximate exposure, which the district court also granted. The appellate court affirmed both rulings.
The plaintiff argued that PATCO, as an urban rapid transit operation, was not a railroad, thus was exempt from federal railroad safety regulations. Although it was undisputed that PATCO was subject to general oversight by the state of New Jersey due to its urban rapid transit status, the court cited both the U.S. Constitution and various rulings in providing a very lengthy discussion on preemption, federal laws, and federal regulations affecting locomotives. Since 1926, with the enactment of the Locomotive Inspection Act, Congress intended to occupy the entire field of locomotive equipment. Thus, the question analyzed by the court was whether federal law, particularly the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), preempted state law claims arising from locomotive equipment even if the entity operating the equipment was not subject to federal railroad regulations. The court held that federal law preempted state law claims because such claims fell within the field preempted by the LIA as defined in various court rulings. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court found that: “‘The LIA preempted ‘the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment,’ and the power delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the predecessor to the FRA, extended ‘to the design, the construction and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances.'” The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in 2012, and in doing so rejected plaintiffs’ argument that state law claims against locomotive equipment manufacturers fell outside the LIA’s preemptive field because these manufacturers were not subject to regulation under the LIA at the time plaintiff was exposed to asbestos. A number of state courts have also held that this field preempts state tort law claims against manufacturers of locomotive equipment for injuries sustained by asbestos exposure.
In this case, PATCO’s locomotives and the air brake systems they contained were designed for use by railroad carriers subject to LIA regulation. Because the plaintiff’s negligence and products liability claims were directed at this locomotive equipment, they were preempted by federal law. That this equipment was a rapid transit operation not subject to LIA regulation does not matter, because case law defined the preempted field as the equipment, not the entity. As such, railroad defendants must prevail because Congress exclusively occupies the field, including the manufacture of locomotive brakes.
Summary judgment was also affirmed for the automotive defendants; the plaintiff must establish both product-defect and medical causation. For medical causation, the plaintiff must prove frequent, regular, and proximate exposure. Evidence that the decedent’s father replaced brake shoes on eight cars over a span of eight years did not satisfy this standard.