# Learmond v Aerco Intl., Inc

Supreme Court of New York, New York County October 1, 2023, Decided INDEX NO. 190009/2021

#### Reporter

2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6412 \*; 2023 NY Slip Op 33385(U) \*\*

[\*\*1] REGINA LEARMOND, AS ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF THOMAS LEARMOND AND REGINA LEARMOND, INDIVIDUALLY, Plaintiff, - v -**AERCO INTERNATIONAL, INC, AIR & LIQUID** SYSTEMS CORPORATION, AS SUCCESSOR-BY-MERGER TO BUFFALO PUMPS, INC, AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., N/K/A RHONE POULENC AG COMPANY, N/K/A BAYER CROPSCIENCE INC, BLACKMER, BMCE INC., F/K/A UNITED CENTRIFUGAL PUMP, BW/IP, INC. AND ITS WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES, CRANE CO, DAP, INC, ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC. INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS SUCCESSOR TO TAPPAN AND COPES-VULCAN, FLOWSERVE US, INC. INDIVIDUALLY AND SUCCESSOR TO ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, EDWARD VALVE, INC., NORDSTROM VALVES, INC., EDWARD VOGT VALVE COMPANY, AND VOGT VALVE COMPANY, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, HARSCO CORPORATION, AS SUCCESSOR TO PATTERSON-KELLEY COMPANY, INC., INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A PATTERSON-KELLEY, ITT LLC., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR TO BELL & GOSSETT AND AS SUCCESSOR TO KENNEDY VALVE MANUFACTURING CO., INC, KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC, KAMCO SUPPLY CORP, KARNAK CORPORATION, MORSE TEC LLC, NATIONAL BULK CARRIERS, PFIZER, INC. (PFIZER), REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, ROPER PUMP COMPANY, THE NASH ENGINEERING COMPANY, U.S. RUBBER COMPANY (UNIROYAL), UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, UNIVERSE TANKSHIPS, VIKING PUMP, INC, WARREN PUMPS, LLC, Defendant.

**Notice:** THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE PRINTED OFFICIAL REPORTS.

# Core Terms

summary judgment, summary judgment motion, products, causation, <u>asbestos</u>, issue of fact, matter of law, documents, illness, <u>asbestos</u>-containing, unequivocal, exposure, e-filed, caulk

Judges: [\*1] PRESENT: HON. ADAM SILVERA, J.S.C.

**Opinion by: ADAM SILVERA** 

## Opinion

### **DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION**

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 145, 146, 147, 148, were read on this motion to/for DISMISS.

**[\*\*2]** The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, it is ordered that the instant motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of this action, pursuant to <u>CPLR §3212</u>, is decided in accordance with the decision below.

Here, defendant DAP, Inc. kin/a La Mirada Products Co., Inc. ("DAP") moves to dismiss this action on the basis that plaintiff's claim is "speculative" because not all DAP caulks historically contained <u>asbestos</u>, and that plaintiff's causation is insufficient. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant [\*2] DAP, Inc. k/n/a La Mirada Products Co., Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. Plaintiff opposes, noting that moving defendant offers no evidence proving that its products could not have caused <u>asbestos</u>-related illness to plaintiff-decedent, Mr. Learmond. Defendant replies.

The Court notes that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should only be granted if the moving party has sufficiently established that it is warranted as a matter of law. See Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324, 501 N.E.2d 572, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1986). "The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case". Winegrad v New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853, 476 N.E.2d 642, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1985). Despite the sufficiency of the opposing papers, the failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion. See *id. at 853*. Additionally, summary judgment motions should be denied if the opposing party presents admissible evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of fact remaining. See Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560, 404 N.E.2d 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1980). "In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the motion court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving [\*\*3] party and should not pass on issues of credibility." Garcia v J.C. Duggan, Inc., 180 AD2d 579, 580, 580 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1st Dep't 1992), citing Dauman Displays, Inc. v Masturzo, 168 AD2d 204, 562 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1st Dep't 1990). The court's role is "issue-finding, [\*3] rather than issue-determination". Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404, 144 N.E.2d 387, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1957) (internal quotations omitted).

As such, summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence actions unless there is no conflict at all in the evidence. See <u>Ugarriza v Schmieder, 46 NY2d 471, 475-476, 386 N.E.2d 1324, 414 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1979)</u>. Furthermore, the Appellate Division, First Department has held that on a motion for summary judgment, it is moving defendant's burden "to unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the causation of plaintiff's injury". *Reid v Georgia-Pacific Corp., 212 AD2d 462, 463, 622 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1st Dep't 1995)*.

In support of its motion, defendant DAP relies upon an affidavit from a former DAP employee, Ward Treat, to establish that "[b]y the end of 1978, DAP no longer manufactured or sold any products that contained

**asbestos**." See Memorandum of Law in Support, *supra*, Exh. B, Affidavit of Ward Treat dated March 1, 2011. Mr. Treat does not possess the requisite personal knowledge to establish that no DAP products containing **asbestos** were in circulation and used by Mr. Learmond. Furthermore, the affidavit fails to address DAP talc or other types of **asbestos**-containing products, and rather, it confirms that some formulations of DAP caulk contained **asbestos**. Given the unequivocal testimony of Mr. Learmond, sufficient issues of fact exist to preclude summary judgment. **[\*4]** *See* Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant DAP, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.

As to causation, DAP's expert affidavit from Robert C. Adams, CIH, CSP, FA1HA, is not casev.specific and forms no opinions based on Mr. Learmond's actual exposure and work timeline. See Affirmation of Andrew J. Kornblau in Support of Defendant DAP, Inc. k/n/a La [\*\*4] Mirada Products Co., Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. J, Affidavit of Robert C. Adams, CIH, CSP, FAIHA, dated November 24, 2020. This is plainly insufficient to meet defendant's burden at summary judgment. Contrarily, plaintiff's expert, Mark Ellis Ginsburg, MD, specifically reviewed Mr. Learmond's case, and medical history along with an analysis of his occupational history. See Affirmation in Opposition, *supra*, Exh. 10, Addendum Report of Mark Ellis Ginsburg, MD, dated December 7, 2022.

Defendant DAP further misstates plaintiff's burden in opposition to summary judgment as the standard set forth in Nemeth v Brenntag, 38 NY3d 336, 173 N.Y.S.3d 511, 194 N.E.3d 266 (2022), which represents an extraordinary post-trial remedy to set aside a jury verdict, rather than the well-settled burden on a motion for summary judgment. Defendant incorrectly states that plaintiff hasfailed to prove specific causation [\*5] herein, at the summary judgment stage. At summary judgment, plaintiff's opposition need only raise a triable issue of fact concerning specific causation. It is defendant's affirmative burden to prove that their asbestos-containing products could not have caused plaintiffs illness. The appropriate standard in a motion for summary judgment for defendant can be found in Dyer v Amchem Products Inc., 207 AD3d 408, 40 (1st Dep't 2022). In Dyer, defendants were granted summary judgment not by "simply argu[ing] that plaintiff could not affirmatively prove causation" but by "affirmatively prov[ing], as a matter of law, that there was no causation." Id. Here, defendant DAP fails to meet their burden on summary judgment as set forth in Dyer.

As a reasonable juror could decide that <u>asbestos</u> exposure from DAP products was a contributing cause of Mr. Learmond's illness, sufficient issues of fact exist to preclude summary judgment.

Accordingly, it is

[\*\*5] ORDERED that defendant DAP's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that within 30 days of entry plaintiff shall serve all parties with a copy of this Decision/Order with notice of entry.

This constitutes the Decision/Order of the Court.

#### 10/01/2023

### DATE

/s/ Adam Silvera

ADAM SILVERA, J.S.C. [\*6]

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