Plaintiff Kenneth Evans was diagnosed with asbestosis after a decades-long career working for the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). For about 35 percent of his employment, Evans worked alongside contractors who helped build and replace gas pipelines; some of those pipelines were covered in a coating that contained asbestos. Evans testified that he worked for SoCalGas from 1954 to 1990. He started out as a pipeline repairman, repairing pipe at various work sites, and working side-by-side with outside contractors on pipeline this work. Specifically, Evans inspected the work done by contractors to ensure that it complied with the required specifications.
Due to his diagnosis, Evans and his wife, plaintiff Dorothy Evans, sued several contractors, alleging that they contributed to Evans’s asbestosis. By the conclusion of trial, the only remaining defendant was contractor Hood Corporation , and the only remaining cause of action was negligence. Upon the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Hood’s conduct exposed Evans to asbestos, but that Hood was not negligent, and a defense judgment was entered. The plaintiff appealed and argued, among other things, that the court gave the jury two erroneous instructions; one about employer duties, and another stating that Hood was required to adhere to a “professional” standard of care.
The first jury instruction at issue read as follows: “An employer has the duty to furnish a place of employment that is safe and helpful to its employees. An employer has a duty to furnish and use safety devices, safeguards, practices, methods and processes that are reasonably adequate to protect the life, safety, and health of its employees. The duty of the employer to provide a safe workplace cannot be delegated to other individuals or companies.” Plaintiffs argue that this jury instruction was legally erroneous in that, “as between the employer and employee, the duty is non-delegable, but that does not mean that a third party who concurrently contributes to the injury cannot be held responsible.” The court did not find this argument persuasive, and ruled, as even if the instruction were an erroneous statement of the law, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, the jury would have reached a result more favorable to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs also argue that the court imposed an unreasonable negligence standard regarding the professional standard of care in the jury instructions and note that this instruction does not apply in an ordinary negligence case such as this one, and laying pipe is not a ‘profession’ in the sense that a standard of care other than ordinary negligence should have applied. The court emphasized that California case law suggests that such an instruction was acceptable in the context of this case. In general, negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. (Rest.2d Torts, § 282.) Thus, as a general proposition one is required to exercise the care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the circumstances. [Citation Omitted]. The court further noted the evidence in this case revolved around specialized contractors and specialized gas company employees who made entire careers of doing the highly specific work of building and repairing gas pipelines. Evans himself testified that the defendant contractors are experts in laying gas pipelines. Additionally, both parties had expert witnesses come in to explain to the jury in detail about the standard of care and what the state of the art was at a particular time.
Therefore, this court ultimately found, given the extensive evidence in this case about the very specialized profession of building and repairing gas pipelines, the lower court did not err by instructing the jury that Hood had a duty to use the skill, knowledge, and care that a reasonably careful construction contractor would have used in similar circumstances. Accordingly, the defense judgment was affirmed by this appellate court finding that there were no errors with respect to the jury instructions.