The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York issued three decisions rejecting appeals of Crane Co. arising from verdicts for Plaintiffs in three separate trials out of New York County.
In Peraica v. A.O. Smith, et al., a jury on December 3, 2013 awarded the plaintiffs $9,900,000 for past pain and suffering against defendant Crane Co., with an order to vacate the award and order new trial as to such damages unless the plaintiffs stipulated to a reduced award of $4.25 million. Crane appealed. The court found that the jury’s verdict was based on sufficient evidence and that there was no reason to disturb the jury’s determination that Crane had a legal obligation to warn. Crane argued that the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Dummitt (Matter of New York Asbestos Litig., 2016 NY Slip Op 05063 2016) created a new rule requiring focus on “economic necessity” to determine a duty to warn and that the rule should not be applied retroactively. The court rejected this argument as Dummitt was based on existing law and did not overrule controlling precedent. The court also rejected Crane’s arguments that the heeding presumption was not explained clearly enough, that the issue of recklessness should not have been submitted to the jury, and that the case was improperly consolidated with others as not giving basis to reverse. Finally, the court found the reduced verdict, despite being significant and exceeding amounts set in some precedent, “deviate[d] materially from what is reasonable compensation to the extent indicated.” Instead, the court found that the jury and trial judge, who had the opportunity to hear the testimony firsthand, believed a substantial award was appropriate and that award was supported by the record.
In Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., Sweberg v. ABB, Inc. et al., a jury awarded plaintiff damages against Crane, including upon remittitur and stipulation by the plaintiffs, $5 million for future pain and suffering reduced to $4.5 million. Again, the court found that the jury’s verdict was based on sufficient evidence and not against the weight of the evidence finding that Crane’s own witness conceded that it would be extremely inefficient and a safety concern for users to operate their products without asbestos insulation and therefore it was “rational for the jury to conclude that defendant had a legal obligation to warn.” The court rejected Crane’s argument that instructions on foreseeability were improper for failure to preserve and because any error was harmless. The court also rejected any argument that Plaintiff did not have sufficient evidence to establish proximate causation citing to the decedent’s testimony and expert opinion from the plaintiff’s expert. Finally, the court found that under the circumstances the award for future pain and suffering deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation to the extent indicated in support of the remittitur and stipulation by plaintiffs of reduced verdict.
In the third decision, the court rejected Crane’s appeal from a jury verdict entered March 11, 2015 in Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., Hackshaw v. ABB, Inc. et al.. In that case, the jury awarded plaintiff damages against Crane, upon the plaintiff’s stipulation to reduce the award for past pain and suffering from $10 million to $6 million. The trial court ordered the award to be vacated unless plaintiffs further stipulated to a reduced award for past pain and suffering of $3,000,000. The court confirmed the jury’s verdict was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence because 1) Crane had promoted use of asbestos-containing materials for insulation of its products for decades; 2) despite having knowledge of the dangers of exposure since the 1930s and 3) because Crane ‘s own witness conceded it would be inefficient and a safety concern to operate the equipment without insulating it in satisfaction of the Dummitt standard. As in the other cases, the court rejected argument that instructions on foreseeability were improper, that there was sufficient evidence for a finding of proximate causation, and that it was rational for the jury to conclude the defendant’s actions were reckless. Finally, the court found that the damages award, as reduced by stipulation, deviated materially from what is reasonable compensation to the extent indicated because although the reduced award was significant and exceeded amounts set in some of the court’s precedents, the jury and trial judge had heard the evidence firsthand and concluded a substantial award was appropriate in light of the evidence in the record.